The presidential elections in Kazakhstan occurred as anticipated, with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev being re-elected for a brand new interval from 2022-2029. In the meantime, the Ukraine battle enters its first winter marketing campaign. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been problematic for Russia’s neighbors, notably non-NATO members like Kazakhstan. How will Astana cope with Moscow going ahead in Tokayev’s new time period?
Understanding the complicated Astana-Moscow relationship
In a 15 October Facebook post, disgraced Kazakhstan businessman Mukhtar Ablyazov made a provocative assertion, accusing Tokayev of being President Vladimir Putin’s “furnishings.” The accusation was a response to Tokayev’s announcement that 2023 will probably be “the yr of the Russian language.” Ablyazov additionally criticized former President Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991-2019), arguing that he “dragged our nation into the Collective Safety Treaty Group and the Eurasian Financial Union.” Lastly, he requested Kazakhstanis if they’d “tolerate a president for whom the pursuits of a overseas state are above the pursuits of native residents.”
These statements demand a dialogue of this complicated relationship. On the hand, Kazakhstan and Russia have continued to have sturdy relations for the reason that dissolution of the Soviet Union. Bilateral commerce reached $24.2 billion in 2021 (for comparability, US-Kazakhstan commerce was round $2.5 billion the identical yr.) The 2 international locations even have sturdy protection ties, as Kazakhstan participated within the Moscow-sponsored Military Video games army workout routines in August. Lastly, whereas Kazakhstan has not supported Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Astana has not condemned it both, voting in opposition to or abstaining from voting within the United Nations when the problem is debated.
Certainly, Kazakhstan is a member of the Eurasian Financial Union (EAEU) and CSTO. Nevertheless, the nation can be a member of different blocs, just like the Group of Turkic States (OTS) and the Convention on Interplay and Constructing Measures in Asia (CICA), which organized a summit in Astana in October.
Thus, whereas there may be an apparent shut relationship between the 2 international locations, Kazakhstan has not acted like Belarus, which has brazenly supported Russia through the battle. Moscow and Minsk have even flirted with the potential for making a super-state. Because the battle commenced, and attributable to worldwide sanctions in opposition to Russia, Kazakhstan has regarded for brand spanking new companions and routes to achieve world markets. Therefore Astana is betting closely on the Trans-Caspian Worldwide Transport Route, which brings collectively Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Turkey. “Kazakhstan hopes to ship as much as 1.5 million tons of oil by way of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline in 2023 as a part of rising efforts to search out export routes bypassing Russia,” just lately reported Eurasianet.
There’s yet one more apparent situation to remember right here. The elephant (or bear) within the room, sustaining cordial relations with Russia, is critical for Kazakhstan’s nationwide integrity. Already distinguished Russian politicians, together with former president Dmitry Medvedev, and celebrities have criticized Astana’s lack of assist for the battle, suggesting that Kazakhstan may undergo the same destiny as Ukraine if Astana doesn’t assist Moscow extra brazenly. Because it at present stands, Kazakhstan has banned its residents from collaborating within the battle. Furthermore, thousands and thousands of ethnic Russians stay in northern Kazakhstan; a priority is that Moscow may make the most of the pretext of defending its kin to justify a future military operation in opposition to the nation, as has occurred with Ukraine. (Curiously, tens of thousands of Russian citizens have moved to Kazakhstan to evade the draft – whether or not this transfer is short-term or everlasting stays to be seen).
Thus, criticizing Kazakhstan’s insurance policies for buying and selling with Russia or sustaining stable diplomatic relations doesn’t take into account the complicated relationship between the 2 governments and pretends {that a} complete decoupling can be straightforward and consequence-free.
Why criticize the Astana-Moscow relationship proper now?
Furthermore, a phrase should be stated about Ablyazov. He’s the previous chairman of BTA Financial institution and a former power minister. He’s accused of embezzling $6 billion throughout his time at BTA, for which he was sentenced in absentia to twenty years for embezzlement. Furthermore, in November 2018, he was discovered responsible of ordering the murder of Yerzhan Tatishev, a banker and a former enterprise accomplice, in 2004 – he was sentenced to life in jail. Ablyazov fled Kazakhstan to London, the place he received asylum, and from there to France; after a messy course of which included an preliminary order to have him extradited, French authorities additionally granted him political asylum in 2020. Furthermore, a Russian court docket additionally discovered Ablyazov responsible in absentia in December 2020: he was sentenced to fifteen years for the embezzlement of $790 million. There are additionally authorized proceedings in opposition to him in america – the US District Court docket for the Southern District of New York dominated in October 2022 in favor of BTA Bank JSC and in opposition to Mukhtar Ablyazov for violating court docket orders.
Ablyazov has denied the fees in opposition to him, and he has turn into a continuing and really vocal critic of Tokayev. He has (unsurprisingly) criticized the 20 November elections and referred to as for peaceable protests in Kazakhstan. A 19 November submit on his Fb account referred to as for the “peaceable overthrow of the Nazarbayev-Tokayev regime” by peacefully coming into authorities buildings. “We [will then] announce the formation of the short-term authorities for a interval of 6 months,” he stated. A previous post provided cash (25 million Tengue or barely over $50 thousand) “to EVERY worker of legislation enforcement companies (police, army, KNB, prosecutor’s workplace, together with cadets), who publicly switched to the aspect of the individuals on the victory rally.” Amnesty was additionally provided. It’s unclear if Ablyazov assumes that he would lead this hypothetical transitional authorities and be able to offer amnesty. Anecdotally, through the January protests in Kazakhstan, Ablyazov referred to as for regime change, stating that he was preparing to return to Kazakhstan to guide a transition authorities.
There are legitimate causes to criticize the 20 November presidential elections in Kazakhstan; it was a widely known conclusion that President Tokayev can be re-elected, because the nation has but to create significant political opposition parties. Furthermore, the January protests in Kazakhstan have been blamed by Astana on worldwide extremist teams to attenuate the legitimacy and calls for of the overall inhabitants who went out to the streets.
Given his historical past with the Nazarbayev administration, it’s logical that Mukhtar Ablyazov will need to proceed criticizing the Tokayev presidency. Nevertheless, whereas with the ability to criticize a authorities is an important element of a free and truthful society (and it’s regarding that electoral protests were not allowed), it should be remembered that a number of governments have convicted Ablyazov of monetary crimes, and he seems to have political ambitions.
Finally, decreasing Astana-Moscow relations right into a master-servant relationship is wrong. Bilateral ties between these two international locations are complicated. The commerce issue makes protecting hyperlinks cordial a precedence for Kazakhstan, as no different regional nation may exchange Russia. Furthermore, given Moscow’s ongoing battle in opposition to Ukraine, it’s logical for Astana to need to preserve cordial diplomatic ties and never seem belligerent and aggressive. Whereas Astana has demonstrated that it’ll not observe Moscow, sure pink strains can’t be crossed. In different phrases, a whole “divorce” is unfeasible.
Wilder Alejandro Sánchez is president of Second Floor Strategies, a consulting agency in Washington, DC. He’s an analyst that screens protection, geopolitical, and commerce points within the Western Hemisphere, Jap Europe, and Central Asia.
The views expressed on this article belong to the authors alone and don’t essentially replicate these of Geopoliticalmonitor.com